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THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT  
AND THE MEANING OF FAMILIAL BONDS 
JULIE NOVKOV∗
The majority of Thirteenth Amendment literature focuses on the 
historical roots of the Amendment, the effects of emancipation, and 
its immediate and long-term significance.  I wish to approach the 
Thirteenth Amendment from a somewhat different perspective and 
think about the meaning of slavery in the context of familial relations.  
This line of inquiry follows feminist historians’ considerations of the 
intersections of race, gender, and sexuality in the antebellum and 
post-bellum years.  By addressing the significance of military service, I 
will seek to create a form of civic membership that exists alongside ci-
tizenship but does not depend on it.  I will then suggest a next step 
forward, using contemporary debates over immigration and marriage 
rights to show how the Thirteenth Amendment can support not only 
robust rights claims by individuals, but also by the family unit as a 
whole. 
 
Part I of this Essay will analyze the meaning of chattel slavery and 
trace the concepts of family, marriage, and military service through-
out the emancipation era.  Part II will explain the different perspec-
tives through which scholars have seen the Thirteenth Amendment, 
involving both the individual and the family.  Part III will examine 
how refocusing the Thirteenth Amendment on the family unit sup-
ports arguments for providing significant rights and protections to 
immigrants and gays and lesbians.  Part IV will briefly summarize and 
conclude this Essay. 
I. WHAT WAS CHATTEL SLAVERY, AND WHAT DID THE THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT ABOLISH? 
The most obvious meaning of chattel slavery is the forced and 
uncompensated expropriation of labor from some individuals by oth-
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ers.1  Scholars have studied this aspect of slavery extensively, and have 
explored its significance beyond the boundaries of the enslavement of 
Africans and their descendants.2  I do not deny the importance of this 
meaning or its connection to the post-bellum transformation of status 
and flowering of contract rights, both of which are intimately con-
nected to the relationship between slavery and labor.3
A.  Family and Defining Slave Status in Dred Scott 
  However, con-
sidering slavery in a familial context reveals equally significant mean-
ings and connections between the present day and the years following 
emancipation. 
Analyzing the meaning of slavery in the context of familial rela-
tions requires tracing the complex and sometimes surprising deve-
lopmental trajectories of laws governing sexuality, family relations, 
and race in the antebellum era.4  Collectively, feminist historians 
studying this perspective have traced the contingent nature of legal 
boundaries between black and white that shaped sexual relations, the 
connections between natality and status, and the need to understand 
both slavery and freedom as strongly conditioned through gender re-
lations.5
This focus on family and natality leads first to a curious moment 
in the infamous case of Dred Scott v. Sandford.
 
6
 
 1. For other definitions of slavery, see James Gray Pope, What’s Different About the Thir-
teenth  Amendment, and Why Does It Matter?, 71 MD. L. REV. 189, 196 (2011) (analyzing nine-
teenth century definitions of slavery from judicial opinions and contemporary dictiona-
ries). 
  Chief Justice Taney’s 
opinion held that Scott was not a citizen of Missouri because his status 
 2. See, e.g., DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF 
THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 8 (rev. ed. 2007) (considering how the discourse of wage 
slavery shaped the development of conceptions of whiteness in the antebellum era). 
 3. By post-bellum, I mean the period immediately following the Civil War and en-
compassing Reconstruction. 
 4. See generally VICTORIA E. BYNUM, UNRULY WOMEN: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL AND 
SEXUAL CONTROL IN THE OLD SOUTH (1992) (exploring the impact of female behavior, 
race, and class on the social structure of antebellum North Carolina); MICHAEL 
GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND FAMILY IN 19TH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985) 
(examining the development of family law and its effects on society); MARTHA HODES, 
WHITE WOMEN, BLACK MEN: ILLICIT SEX IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH (1997) 
(analyzing the violent transformation of governmental and societal reactions to interracial 
relationships in the post-emancipation South); PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: 
MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA (2009) (describing the history 
of miscegenation laws and the idea of white supremacy). 
 5. See BYNUM, supra note 4, at 3, 5–6 (reviewing several works by feminist historians 
exploring the connections between gender, the family, and slavery). 
 6. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII & XIV. 
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as a slave was fixed by the Constitution and any attempt by Congress 
to restrict the expansion of slavery into new U.S. territories was un-
constitutional.7  Justice Curtis’s dissent claimed that Scott was not a 
slave, but a free man.8  The two opinions thus reached drastically dif-
ferent outcomes; yet, both opinions speak in passing about marriage 
regulations, familial relations, and natality in defining slavery as a sta-
tus.9
Chief Justice Taney’s presentation of the fundamental question 
presented in Dred Scott highlights a very particular definition of sla-
very.  He writes: 
 
The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors 
were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become 
a member of the political community formed and brought 
into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and 
as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and 
immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen? . . .  
[T]he plea applies to that class of persons only whose ances-
tors were negroes of the African race, and imported into this 
country, and sold and held as slaves.  The only matter in is-
sue before the court, therefore, is, whether the descendants 
of such slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or who are 
born of parents who had become free before their birth, are 
citizens of a State, in the sense in which the word citizen is 
used in the Constitution of the United States.10
The status of slavery is, for Chief Justice Taney, a status estab-
lished by natality, and it is a status that transcends emancipation.
  
11
 
 7. Id. at 451–54.   
  
Race is intertwined with slavery by the original decision of white co-
 8. Id. at 569–70 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (explaining that the slave status of Scott’s par-
ents and the possibility that Scott had been born a slave did not disqualify his claim to have 
become a free man before he brought this action). 
 9. See, e.g., id. at 408–16 (majority opinion) (explaining the laws of several states 
which prohibited interracial marriage); id. at 410 (explaining that the opening words of 
the Declaration of Independence “would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if 
they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood.  But it is too 
clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and 
formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration . . . .”); id. at 599 
(Curtis, J., dissenting) (“It is in reference to his status, as viewed in other States and coun-
tries, that the contract of marriage and the birth of children becomes strictly material.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
 10. Id. at 403 (majority opinion). 
 11. See id. (explaining that the Court’s opinion speaks only “of those persons who are 
the descendants of Africans who were imported into this country, and sold as slaves” re-
gardless of whether such person has been emancipated or whether their parents had been 
freed before their birth). 
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lonists to import “negroes of the African race” into this country and 
sell and hold them as slaves.12  The descendants of slaves cannot 
achieve membership in the community of citizens.13
In arguing that “[t]he legislation of the different colonies fur-
nishes positive and indisputable proof of this fact,” Taney first cites 
several laws banning and punishing intermarriage between negroes or 
mulattos and whites.
  
14  While Chief Justice Taney develops other 
frames to establish the inferiority of blacks and their unsuitability for 
citizenship, his reliance on ancestry, natality, and the regulation of 
marriage up front in his analysis is striking.  The case turns on Chief 
Justice Taney’s finding that the Missouri Compromise could not have 
legally created a zone of freedom, but the Chief Justice’s reasoning 
concerning Scott’s ancestry and the legal restrictions on familial rela-
tions between and among slaves undergirds this finding.15
Much of the debate among the Justices concerned the validity of 
Missouri’s laws and the status of the Compromise.  However, Justice 
Benjamin Curtis, a Whig and by no means a radical, took issue with 
Chief Justice Taney’s analysis.
 
16  He argued that the Chief Justice’s 
presumptions about Scott’s status were incorrect in their reliance on 
Scott’s ancestry.17  As Justice Curtis explained, an individual’s alleged 
status as a slave could not be determined by looking to the statuses of 
that person’s parents.18  Rather, Justice Curtis argued that a person’s 
status as a slave or free man had to rest on that individual’s own life 
conditions.19
 
 12. Id.   
  This reconfiguration of how to define a person’s status 
 13. Id. at 404. 
 14. Id. at 408–09, 413, 416 (citing a 1717 Maryland law which punished any white man 
or woman who married a black individual with seven years of servitude, 1705 and 1786 
Massachusetts laws prohibiting interracial marriage, and an 1822 Rhode Island law ban-
ning any and all interracial marriages). 
 15. Id. at 403, 417, 452–54. 
 16. Id. at 564 (Curtis, J., dissenting).  The disagreement between Justice Curtis and 
Chief Justice Taney was so strong that it caused Justice Curtis to resign from the Court over 
the bitterness engendered by the Dred Scott ruling, upon which he was quickly selected as 
President Andrew Johnson’s chief counsel during Johnson’s impeachment.  STUART 
STREICHLER, JUSTICE CURTIS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA: AT THE CROSSROADS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 145–50, 172–74 (2005). 
 17. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 569–70 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
 18. Id. (“For they might have been sold after he was born; or the plaintiff himself, if 
once a slave, might have became a freeman before action brought.  To aver that his ances-
tors were sold as slaves, is not equivalent, in point of law, to an averment that he was a 
slave.”) 
 19. See id. at 571 (“If any such person can be a citizen, this plaintiff has the right to the 
judgment of the court that he is so; for no cause is shown by the plea why he is not so, ex-
cept his descent and the slavery of his ancestors.”). 
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changed the fundamental question of the case for Justice Curtis, ren-
dering it as “whether any person of African descent, whose ancestors 
were sold as slaves in the United States, can be a citizen of the United 
States.”20  If such citizenship was possible—and Justice Curtis claimed 
that numerous state precedents demonstrated that it was—then he 
believed that Scott was entitled to his freedom, “for no cause is shown 
by the plea why he is not so, except his descent and the slavery of his 
ancestors.”21
Justice Curtis emphasized Scott’s status as a married man (with 
two daughters born in wedlock) as clear evidence that Scott could not 
be considered a slave.
 
22  No one contested that Dred Scott married 
Harriet in 1836 with the consent of Dr. Emerson, or that Harriet had 
borne two daughters in wedlock.23  The question for Justice Curtis was 
then “whether, after the marriage of the plaintiff in the Territory, 
with the consent of Dr. Emerson, any other State or country can, con-
sistently with the settled rules of international law, refuse to recognise 
and treat him as a free man, when suing for the liberty of himself, his 
wife, and the children of that marriage.”24  Justice Curtis continued 
that because Scott was a free man according to the laws of the territo-
ry in which he was married, and because Scott’s master consented to 
his marriage, he had the capacity to contract a valid marriage.25
Scott’s possessing the freedom to marry, however, contradicts the 
logic of Chief Justice Taney’s claim that Scott remained a slave.  As 
Justice Curtis outlined, insisting that Scott was still a slave would nec-
essarily invalidate his marriage and his familial relations with his wife 
and children:  
  
So that, though lawfully married in the Territory, when they 
came out of it, into the State of Missouri, they were no long-
er husband and wife; and a child of that lawful marriage, 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 599 (“[T]here can be no doubt these parties were capable of contracting a 
lawful marriage, attended with all the usual civil rights and obligations of that condition. 
In that Territory they were absolutely free persons, having full capacity to enter into the civil 
contract of marriage.” (emphasis added)); see also GRETCHEN RITTER, THE CONSTITUTION 
AS SOCIAL DESIGN 71–73 (2006) (“Scott’s capacity for consent [to marriage] was indicative 
of his ability to act as a legal person.”).  Some scholars speculate that Dred Scott’s wife, 
Harriet Robinson Scott, had an even stronger legal claim to freedom than her husband 
based upon her residential history in states and territories that either did not have slavery 
or were in the process of eliminating it.  Lea VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. 
Dred Scott, 106 YALE L.J. 1033, 1034 (1997). 
 23. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 398 (majority opinion); id. at 599 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
 24. Id. at 599 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. 
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though born under the same dominion where its parents 
contracted a lawful marriage, is not the fruit of that mar-
riage, nor the child of its father . . . .26
This would constitute a gross violation of the sanctity of contract, par-
ticularly the special contract that forms marriages.
   
27
For Justice Curtis, this logic had important implications for the 
master who allowed a slave to marry.  As he explained, the marital re-
lation did not affect only the status of the individual marrying, but al-
so “those of the other party to the contract, and of their descendants 
to the remotest generation.”
  It would also de-
stroy the legitimacy of the family, a core purpose of the state recog-
nized not just in American law, but in American engagements with 
other nations.  
28
What, then, shall we say of the consent of the master, that 
the slave may contract a lawful marriage, attended with all 
the civil rights and duties which belong to that relation; that 
he may enter into a relation which none but a free man can 
assume—a relation which involves not only the rights and 
duties of the slave, but those of the other party to the con-
tract, and of their descendants to the remotest generation?  
In my judgment, there can be no more effectual abandon-
ment of the legal rights of a master over his slave, than by 
the consent of the master that the slave should enter into a 
contract of marriage, in a free State, attended by all the civil 
rights and obligations which belong to that condition.
 On this basis, he concluded:  
29
In Justice Curtis’s analysis, the generational implications of sla-
very are inapposite to the implications of Chief Justice Taney’s argu-
ment: Justice Curtis would find that the (presumably male) slave who 
marries becomes free and transmits this freedom to his wife and the 
children and descendants produced through the marriage.
  
30
B.  Marriage and Emancipation 
 
As Lea VanderVelde and Sandhya Subramanian have shown, 
Dred and Harriet Scott were trapped in a larger struggle over the 
 
 26. Id. at 599–600.  
 27. Id. at 600–01 (explaining that no law of Missouri can annul a marriage lawfully en-
tered into in Wisconsin and to hold otherwise would “destroy the obligation of the con-
tract of marriage, and bastardize their issue, and reduce them to slavery”). 
 28. Id. at 600. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  For a summary of Chief Justice Taney’s argument, see supra text accompanying 
notes 10–15. 
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meaning of marriage that encompassed slavery but also addressed 
contemporary changes in the meaning of being married as a status.31  
They argue that legal observers of the 1840s and ’50s agreed that “the 
institution of marriage was thought to be legally antithetical to sla-
very.”32  Both slavery and marriage were patriarchal institutions, but 
marriage presumed particular elements of male autonomy and au-
thority that subverted slavery.  A husband had to have sufficient au-
tonomy to form the marriage contract, sufficient control and authori-
ty over his wife and children, sufficient legal personhood to assert his 
own and their interests in court, and sufficient authoritative contrac-
tual power to provide for his family.33  Furthermore, he was presumed 
to exercise mastery within the household.34  All of these presumptions 
about marriage rendered the status or condition of being a married 
man and the status of being a slave as fundamentally incompatible.35
This tension had increasingly different implications for northern 
states and southern states.  Northern states increasingly took the posi-
tion that a slave who married a free woman with the consent of his 
master was thereby emancipated.
  
36  Southern states, however, adopted 
the analysis of legal analyst Thomas Cobb, who drew from the law of 
feudal relations to argue that a man’s slave status did not change as a 
result of his marriage, but rather that a slave’s marriage could never 
be a true marital relation due to its potential to undermine the au-
thority of the master.37  The matter was thus ambiguous, and in Dred 
Scott, the Court (except for Justice Curtis), ignored the implications of 
Dred and Harriet Robinson Scott’s marriage, implying acceptance of 
the framework that prevailed in the South.38
The northern idea that marriage was incompatible with slavery 
and that legitimate marriage negated slavery was shown during the 
Civil War to work aggressively in the other direction.  Historians have 
discussed at length the role of marriage promotion as an urgent poli-
cy priority during slavery’s collapse and the initiation of a new politi-
 
 
 31. VanderVelde & Subramanian, supra note 22, at 1103. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 1103–04. 
 34. Id. at 1103. 
 35. Id. at 1103–04. 
 36. Id. at 1105. 
 37. Id. at 1106–07 (explaining that this pertained to both the purported wife, whose 
status followed that of her husband, and over the husband-slave himself, who could not 
maintain a position of mastery due to his slave status). 
 38. Id. at 1109–11. 
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cal and social order.39  First, the Union generals who established con-
traband camps for self-emancipated slaves viewed the creation of or-
derly married relations among the freedmen and women as a matter 
of nearly equal significance to the logistics of managing the basic 
needs of a large population of ill-provisioned refugees.40  Even the ra-
cially provocative early legislative efforts of southern lawmakers in-
cluded detailed mechanisms for solemnizing or presuming marriages 
and establishing the legitimacy through marriage of children born 
slaves.41  Second, the Freedmen’s Bureau was an important institu-
tional mechanism for organizing and legitimizing family units.42  
Agents provided practical assistance to what must have been a bewil-
dering array of kin and sexual relationships among people previously 
denied the right to make the normatively acceptable monogamous, 
binding legal commitments to each other and to their children.43  
Husbands and wives were found and paired off and children were 
placed with parents based on biological relationships when possible.  
Local and external agents fretted over how to manage women with 
children of different fathers or women who had partnered with men 
after bearing children fathered by another man.44
Ultimately, the riotous multitude of familial relationships among 
ex-slaves and between ex-slaves and those who had never experienced 
slavery were largely tamed, or at least the norm was established that 
these relationships should follow the monogamous norms of white 
marital relationships.
 
45
 
 39. See, e.g., Darlene C. Goring, The History of Slave Marriage in the United States, 39 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 299, 313–38 (2006) (explaining the antebellum and post-bellum laws of 
southern states which dealt with the right of blacks to marry); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating 
Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 
151–56 (1998) (examining the bans on interracial marriages in the post-war South); Ange-
la Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure as the Revival of 
Post-Bellum Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1653–63 (2005) (arguing that efforts to allow 
newly freed blacks to engage in legal marriage was an attempt by whites to maintain con-
trol and regulate their behavior so that blacks did not disrupt white society). 
  Intense discussion about the acquisition of 
individual civil and political rights and the resistance of white sou-
 40. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 
5, 48, 56–57 (1988). 
 41. See Goring, supra note 39, at 313–38 (examining the laws of southern states that 
conferred the right to marry on newly freed blacks). 
 42. Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African 
American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 279–84 (1999). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 39, at 1657–61 (describing the various structures of 
freedmen families and how the Freedmen’s Bureau responded to those relationships). 
 45. JULIE NOVKOV, RACIAL UNION: LAW, INTIMACY, AND THE WHITE STATE IN ALABAMA, 
1865–1954, at 5 (2008). 
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therners provoked protective legislation from Congress, and ultimate-
ly led to the adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.46
C.  Slavery and Military Service 
  
While these Amendments framed rights broadly and neutrally, the na-
ture and scope of these rights had gendered implications arising pri-
marily from the context in which they had been gained—through ar-
guments about the meaning of military service. 
Arguments for expanding freedmen’s rights were gendered and 
based significantly in military sacrifice and service.  The rights claimed 
by and for black men were fundamentally connected to masculinity, 
but also fundamentally connected to the idea of a head of household 
responsible for the care and welfare of the family.47  This conception 
of masculinity included contract rights to protect economic security, 
voting rights to advance the interests of women represented by their 
husbands, self-defense rights that protected the home and family 
against both private and public violence, and legal rights to muster 
the state’s protective power for access and exercise of these other 
rights.48
Likewise, by the end of the war, both the North and South 
agreed that slavery was fundamentally incompatible with military ser-
vice.  In the North, early debates focused on whether residents of con-
traband camps should be mobilized as military resources, the forma-
tion of the first units of freedmen, and the ultimate use of large 
numbers of freedmen to supplement the Union’s manpower losses 
through desertion and draft evasion.
  
49  By the end of the war, south-
ern policymakers were also ready to embrace emancipation for those 
slaves willing to fight.  Proposals discussed in the Confederate Con-
gress and endorsed by Robert E. Lee entailed the emancipation not 
only of slaves agreeing to serve as soldiers, but of their families as 
well.50
 
 46. See Pope, supra note 
  Military service thus appears both as a right/duty for free men 
and as an emancipatory device in itself, but it also bears interesting 
links to the family. 
1, at 191. 
 47. VanderVelde & Subramanian, supra note 22, at 1103–04. 
 48. Id.  
 49.  PHILIP A. KLINKNER WITH ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND 
DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 53–55 (1998).  
 50. David P. Currie, Through the Looking Glass: The Confederate Constitution in Congress, 
1861–1865, 90 VA. L. REV. 1257, 1295–1305 (2004). 
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II.  CITIZENSHIP, FAMILY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
This Essay views struggles over the scope of freedom gained by 
emancipation through the lens of citizenship and inquires how this 
package of promised rights does or does not provide a framework for 
full citizenship on the part of members of politically and racially sub-
ordinated groups.  Many of the historical considerations of the post-
bellum constitutional struggles have addressed these issues through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Its Citizenship Clause clearly repudiates 
the reasoning in Dred Scott and frames the discussion in the terms de-
scribed above, while situating the rights as rights of citizens.51  The 
tripartite division of rights into the uneasily bounded categories of po-
litical, civil, and social rights held citizenship as the touchstone form 
of membership around which the other debates swirled.52
A.  Citizenship and the Thirteenth Amendment 
  
But what did it mean not to be a slave?  In the cases students 
commonly read to understand Reconstruction, post-Reconstruction, 
and the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth 
Amendment is generally read alongside it, and the application and 
outcome of both Amendments tend to point in the same direction.  
To list just the most famous examples, in the Slaughter-House Cases,53 
the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Im-
munities Clause does not apply against the state, and the limitation on 
the independent slaughter-house operators does not constitute a 
form of slavery.54  The Civil Rights Cases55 found that the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not independently authorize mechanisms of charg-
ing private defendants with acts of discrimination against freedmen.56  
And Plessy v. Ferguson57
 
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 infamously declares state-sponsored segrega-
tion not to be a badge of servitude but merely the construction blacks 
choose to put upon the principle of separation as part of a larger ar-
 52. Within these debates, civil rights “pertained to the economic sphere and were re-
garded as basic and fundamental.”  PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL 
SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 70–71 (2011).  Political rights came from the “political 
collective and were not seen (initially) as necessary for freedom.”  Id.  And social rights 
“designated a sphere in which ‘association’ took place.”  Id.  
 53. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
 54. Id. at 78–83. 
 55. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 56. Id. at 11–13. 
 57. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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gument that segregation does not constitute a violation of the funda-
mental principle of equality for citizens.58
What was or is the point of the Thirteenth Amendment in light 
of its more litigated and celebrated successors, the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments?  If citizenship alone is the point, and the 
scope and extent of birthright citizenship is the fundamental fulcrum 
of debate, then the Thirteenth Amendment seems mere make-
weight.
 
59
B.  Theories of the Family and the Thirteenth Amendment 
  I argue that there may be some value in considering the le-
gal recognition of the family beyond conceptions of citizenship and 
civic membership, and in considering the significance of struggles 
over military service in light of the experiences and arguments over 
emancipation.  I seek to make a move similar to that of Justice Curtis 
and leverage non-slave status into an argument for a form of civic 
membership that exists alongside citizenship without depending 
upon it.  But I also want to go further and use the Thirteenth 
Amendment to analyze the possibility of rights that extend not just to 
the individual, but to the family. 
Part of this argument depends not on the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, but on the significance of family in constitutional and state 
structures.  Liberal political theory ranging from Tocqueville to con-
temporary debates has focused largely on the significance of liberal 
individualism.  Recent debates have focused extensively on whether 
liberalism is inherently egalitarian but hampered by the evolution of 
non-egalitarian ideologies,60 or whether liberalism incorporated with-
in itself elements of ascription and hierarchy that predated liberal-
ism.61
 
 58. Id. at 550–52. 
  These debates, as well as debates over American exceptional-
ism and the presence or lack of feudal legacies, configure the 
 59. The nadir of the Thirteenth Amendment as a place for constitutional argumenta-
tion can probably be found in Linda Crane’s 2003 suggestion that the Commerce Clause 
might be a better site for rooting constitutional arguments in favor of eliminating the last 
economic vestiges of slavery than the Thirteenth Amendment.  Linda R. Crane, From Gib-
bons to Lopez: Does the Commerce Clause Remain a Viable Tool for Eliminating the Vestiges of Sla-
very? 4 BARRY L. REV. 71, 81–82 (2003). 
 60. For the most comprehensive argument on this point, see ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC 
IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 4–5 (1997). 
 61. See, e.g., Jacqueline Stevens, Beyond Tocqueville, Please!, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 987 
(1995) (critiquing Rogers Smith and explaining W.E.B. Du Bois’s description of ascriptive 
norms). 
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individual as the fundamental unit of state membership or belong-
ing.62
Critical feminist analysts of American political theory and politi-
cal development question this individualist formulation by surveying 
the role of non-individual units in the development of the American 
state.  Priscilla Yamin, drawing from the work of historian Nancy Cott, 
considers the role of marriage as a site for development and a prem-
ier location for the resolution of significant political anxieties about 
America and Americanism because of the symbolic importance of the 
marital unit in the minds of state actors.
  
63  Patricia Strach considers 
the rhetorical significance and political import of families both as 
“family” is used to drive policy outcomes in political struggle and as 
the family unit is mobilized as an agent of the state for collective and 
distributive purposes.64  These insights follow earlier feminist observa-
tions that politics looks different when we take into account the de-
pendency and interconnectedness seen more readily if women are 
centered in the analysis.65
Most historical attempts to make more of the Thirteenth 
Amendment considered other forms of coerced labor or the civic sta-
tus of other racially subordinated groups.  The framers of the Thir-
teenth Amendment considered the problem of the “cooly” trade and 
wanted to close the door to the functional ownership of Chinese rail-
road workers, even if they did not contemplate the extension of citi-
zenship to these workers or their descendants.
 
66
 
 62. See, e.g., KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (1991) (“[T]he liberal centerpiece, is the sove-
reignty of the individual citizen.”). 
  In the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, courts applied the Thirteenth 
Amendment independently (without the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments) in struggles against peonage.  This independent appli-
 63. Priscilla Yamin, Nuptial Nation: Marriage and the Politics of Civic Membership in 
the United States (2005) (unpublished dissertation, New School for Social Research). 
 64. PATRICIA STRACH, ALL IN THE FAMILY: THE PRIVATE ROOTS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC 
POLICY (2007). 
 65. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY (2004) (arguing the conception that society is organized by familial relation-
ships is outdated and that caretaking relationships are a more accurate reflection of socie-
ty’s organization). 
 66. See John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigrants and 
the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Laws, 3 
ASIAN L.J. 55, 71–75 (1996) (noting that President Lincoln outlawed the cooly trade prior 
to signing the Emancipation Proclamation). 
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cation reinforced the contemporary impression that its primary core 
concerns labor and labor rights.67
Recently, left legal theorists have begun to argue in favor of revi-
talizing the Amendment as a source of anti-subordination principles.
   
68  
A substantial portion of this argument uses the Thirteenth Amend-
ment as an alternative ground for the liberty and equality-inflected 
purposes usually addressed through the Fourteenth Amendment.  As 
noted above, labor is an obvious issue, and many scholars have looked 
thoughtfully at how some practices involving immigrant workers are 
functionally equivalent to slavery.69  Reproductive labor, too, has 
come under scrutiny when it is arguably coerced or commodified in 
ways that scholars have identified as inappropriate or dehumanizing.70  
Another potential contemporary interpretation of badges of slavery 
(particularly relevant as we approach the 150th anniversary of the Civ-
il War) is the use of Confederate signs and symbols as a means of ex-
pressing a hostile agenda toward African-Americans.71
III.  REFOCUSING THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT ON THE FAMILY UNIT 
TO STRENGTHEN ITS CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE 
  These creative 
reconfigurations continue to frame slavery as an individual problem, 
however, and emancipation as an individualized process. 
The remainder of this Essay addresses the deficiencies of the re-
configurations described above by focusing on the implications of the 
fundamental protection for the integrity of the family unit, the radical 
implications of birth as a form of belonging, and the connection be-
tween military service and emancipation which I believe also fall un-
der the Thirteenth Amendment’s command to the nation and to 
Congress. 
First, the family unit.  The Thirteenth Amendment does not de-
fine family, and its framers presumably did not have any particularly 
radical notion of family in mind when drafting the Amendment.  
Nonetheless, in Dred Scott and elsewhere, evidence suggests that one 
 
 67. Cf. Pope, supra note 1, at 193; see also Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: 
Civil Rights & the Thirteenth Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REV. 307, 308–09, 333 (2004) (arguing 
that the Thirteenth Amendment applies to “interferences against autonomy”). 
 68. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 255 (2010). 
 69. Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers’ Rights in a Post-Hoffman World: Organizing 
Around the Thirteenth Amendment, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 651, 651–72 (2004). 
 70. Pamela D. Bridgewater, Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom: The Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s Role in the Struggle for Reproductive Rights, 3 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 401 (2000). 
 71. Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment Ap-
proach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539, 542–43, 607–09 (2002). 
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of the most disturbing elements of slavery to those seeking its aboli-
tion was its effect on families.72  Second is the issue of status at birth.  
As Frederick Douglass and numerous other critics emphasized, slavery 
undercut the fundamental promise of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence that all men were created (born) equal and acquired at birth 
their God-given rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.73  
If slaves could be excluded from this guarantee simply on the basis of 
their natality, who else might be at risk? (By the 1850s, some antisla-
very advocates had begun to answer this question by looking to the 
condition of women.)  And third is the question of military service.  
While the Amendment itself says nothing about military service, as 
noted above, military service was intimately connected to discussions 
of emancipation on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line.74  As accep-
tance of black soldiers spread among northern military leaders, they 
increasingly began to conceptualize a war that would have as its in-
evitable endpoint the elimination of slavery and all of its incidents.  
Advocates for emancipation also pressed the idea that freedmen’s mil-
itary contributions constituted a down payment on freedom for all 
descendants of Africans, both as a moral matter and because in prac-
tical terms, a soldier (and by extension his family) could not be sub-
jected to slavery.75
This Part examines how these principles work with regard to con-
temporary struggles over immigration, including proposals to end 
birthright citizenship for children of illegal immigrants, and same-sex 
marriage.  I consider both of these issues through the lens of the 
Thirteenth Amendment as it protects family integrity rather than the 
lens of citizenship or civic membership as established and protected 
for individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
  
 
 72. Antebellum critiques of slavery on these grounds highlighted several elements: the 
lack of capacity for formation of long-term monogamous bonds, the production of child-
ren without any guarantee of long-term parental relationships with mothers or fathers, the 
prevalence of sexual coercion of black women and their incapacity to resist (which was 
seen as an assault both to the women and to the black men who sought to bond with 
them), the uses of black women as “breeding stock,” the automatic classification of any 
child born to a slave woman as a slave regardless of the status of the child’s father, and re-
lated insults. 
 73. Christopher N. Breiseth, Lincoln and Frederick Douglass: Another Debate, 68 J. ILL. 
STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY 9, 26 (1975). 
 74. See supra text accompanying notes 49–50. 
 75. See, e.g., Resolutions of the Convention, 1864, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL 
CONVENTION OF COLORED MEN 33–36 (William Loren Katz ed., reprinted Arno Press 
1969). 
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A.  Immigration 
On immigration, recently two popular and controversial political 
initiatives have run up against each other.  One initiative presses for 
broader access to permanent residency and/or citizenship for immi-
grants who serve in the American armed forces, even if they entered 
the nation illegally as children.  The other presses for the reinterpre-
tation or amendment of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
birthright citizenship to individuals born in the United States to par-
ents who are in the country illegally.  Arguments over both of these 
initiatives have tended to play out in terms of citizenship and civic 
membership and in terms of background Fourteenth Amendment 
conceptions of equality. What might they look like if reconsidered 
through the framework suggested by the Thirteenth Amendment? 
Non-citizens serving in the U.S. armed forces do have access to a 
faster track to permanent residency or citizenship if they serve in 
times of war and are legally enlisted.  President George W. Bush is-
sued an executive order triggering the operation of this provision in 
2002, and many immigrant members of the armed services have bene-
fited from this.76  The process, however, is discretionary and based on-
ly in moral suasion rather than in any coherent claim based in consti-
tutional rights.77
When the armed forces allow an individual to serve a nation, the 
precedent set by freedmen who fought in the Civil War suggests that 
the relationship between the individual and the nation is fundamen-
tally changed.  As federal regulations demonstrate, however, citizen-
ship is not an assured outcome of this relationship.  But the expe-
rience of emancipation suggests that, while access to citizenship may 
remain ambiguous, slavery is both constitutionally and practically in-
compatible with military service.   
  Advocates for immigrants argue on the behalf of 
soldiers in terms of access to citizenship, but a Thirteenth Amend-
ment argument that sacrificing in a time of war is fundamentally in-
compatible with something less than full membership in the polity 
might bolster these claims.  
This has important implications for the families of soldiers.  Sol-
diers, like other citizens, can have family members who are not citi-
zens, or in some cases, not legal residents.  In the United States, as in 
 
 76. Exec. Order No. 13,269, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,287 (Jan. 3, 2002).  See Fact Sheet: Honor-
ing Immigrant Members of America’s Armed Services in JOHN T. WOOLLEY & GERHARD 
PETERS, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
?pid=82610. 
 77. See id. (listing good moral character as one of the requirements for expedited na-
turalization). 
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most nations, the construction of the soldier remains staunchly mas-
culine and hews to a traditional conception of masculinity.78  Even in 
the contemporary era, a masculine ethic of protective and financially 
supportive investment in the family is presumed, giving the military 
incentives to ensure that the families of service members are safe.79  
Thus, “for members of the military, the assurance that these spouses, 
children, and other family members are safe and well is critical to ser-
vicemembers’ mission readiness, focus, and effectiveness in protecting 
the United States.”80  Family members of those serving are also eligi-
ble for expedited or overseas naturalization, but like members of the 
military, they face challenges that bring debates over immigration and 
citizenship into conflict with cultural constructions of the soldier.81
1.  Yaderlin Jimenez and How the Thirteenth Amendment Can Help 
the Immigrant Spouses of Soldiers 
  
Immigration advocates for these individuals seek to exploit these con-
structions in favor of their clients, but Thirteenth Amendment argu-
ments could provide additional leverage by changing the framework 
for these claims. 
The case of Yaderlin Jimenez, the undocumented wife of an 
American soldier, is helpful in illustrating these dynamics.  Jimenez 
was threatened with deportation when her status was discovered, but 
her case resulted in a public outpouring of support as deportation 
proceedings were initiated while her husband was missing in action 
and presumed dead in Iraq.  In particular, the analytic processes at 
work in advocacy for these types of accommodations appear in U.S. 
Senator John Kerry’s public statements about the case.82
 
 78. CYNTHIA ENLOE, MANEUVERS: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF MILITARIZING 
WOMEN’S LIVES 235–36 (2000). 
   
 79. While the phrase “military spending” is usually understood to address payment for 
troops and their materiel, it also encompasses what is probably the largest and most com-
prehensive social service bureaucracy in the United States: providing housing, support, 
medical care, job placement services, and a myriad of other resources to the families of 
active military personnel.  See KAREN HOUPPERT, HOME FIRES BURNING: MARRIED TO THE 
MILITARY—FOR BETTER OR WORSE 85–90 (2005). 
 80. Susan E. Timmons & Margaret D. Stock, Immigration Issues Faced by U.S. Servicememb-
ers: Challenges and Solutions, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 270, 273 (2009). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Throughout his Senate career, John Kerry has been deeply engaged with military 
veterans’ issues and his public persona is built in part upon his own identity as a Vietnam-
era combat veteran who departed the service with a Silver Star, a Bronze Star, and three 
Purple Hearts but then became a public opponent of the war.  He currently chairs the Se-
nate Committee on Foreign Relations and chaired the Senate Select Committee on 
POW/MIA Affairs as it sought to bind the wounds of Vietnam through negotiating norma-
lization of relations and determining the fates of missing American soldiers.  DOUGLAS 
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In June of 2007, Kerry and Senator Ted Kennedy released an 
open letter to Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff regard-
ing the Jimenezes.  Kerry’s narrative states that Yaderlin entered the 
country illegally in 2001 but that she married Army Specialist Alex Ji-
menez in 2004, “and it was then that her status was first brought to the 
attention of immigration officials.”83  The letter then detailed Alex 
Jimenez’s service and disappearance, noting that he had been 
awarded a Purple Heart and had chosen to return to Iraq for a second 
tour of duty.84  Kerry noted the circumstances around Jimenez’s dis-
appearance: the discovery of the body of one of his comrades and Ji-
menez’s identification card in an al Qaeda safe house shortly after the 
ambush in which he and two other soldiers disappeared.85
Kerry then rhetorically connected the claim for forbearance for 
Yaderlin to her identity as a military wife.  He explained: 
  The clear 
implication was that Yaderlin was waiting for confirmation of her sol-
dier husband’s death (which occurred more than a year after his dis-
appearance). 
I do not believe that Yaderlin should have her stress and 
grief compounded by additional worries about her own im-
migration status.  I request that no further action be taken 
[in] Yaderlin’s case while her husband is missing in action.  
As Yaderlin waits to hear what has happened to her husband 
I ask that she be allowed to stay in our country.  I believe this 
is a very real test of our government’s compassion for a mili-
tary family which has already made enormous sacrifices for 
the United States.86
Obviously any undocumented immigrant may be experiencing 
stress and grief in her or his life circumstances when going through a 
deportation proceeding, and this stress and grief may be completely 
unrelated to the proceeding.  No formal policy authorizes forbear-
ance on this account.  But Yaderin’s circumstances, Kerry argued, 
warranted a different calculus, at least as long as her husband’s whe-
 
 
BRINKLEY, TOUR OF DUTY: JOHN KERRY AND THE VIETNAM WAR (2004); Biography, JOHN 
KERRY, http://kerry.senate.gov/about/ (last visited July 24, 2011). 
 83. Kerry does not indicate why proceedings were initiated against Yaderlin after the 
marriage, but this may have resulted from an attempt by the Jimenezes to register Yaderlin 
as a military spouse.  Letter from John Kerry, U.S. Senator, to Michael Chertoff, Secretary 
of Homeland Security (June 20, 2007), available at 
http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=cebda090-62f5-41ed-8680-741856d0a659 (last 
visited July 24, 2011).  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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reabouts remained unknown. Kerry tapped into an ideal of govern-
mental compassion for “a military family,” incorporating Yaderlin into 
the military frame and crediting her for the “enormous sacrifices” that 
Alex had already made through his honorable service.87
Kerry’s public comments that accompanied the release of the let-
ter were even stronger.  He claimed that the Department of Homel-
and Security’s threats to deport Yaderlin were “unconscionable” and 
argued in favor of a blanket policy that “under no condition” should 
close family members of a deployed service member serving abroad 
ever be deported.
 
88  He vowed to do everything in his power to pre-
vent Yaderlin’s deportation, since “[o]ur country owes a special debt 
of gratitude to anyone who puts their life on the line by wearing a 
uniform and fighting overseas on behalf of the United States.”89
Kerry’s impassioned defense made an impact.  Shortly after his 
letter and press conference, Michael Chertoff responded that he had 
requested that immigration officials cease seeking the removal of Ya-
derlin Jimenez.  In his statement announcing this outcome, Chertoff 
explained, “The sacrifices made by our soldiers and their families de-
serve our greatest respect.”
 
90  Yet while Yaderlin’s personal dilemma 
was resolved favorably, other families remained caught in the same 
trap.  The Associated Press article that reported the resolution of Ya-
derlin Jimenez’s case reported additional sympathetic vignettes of 
deployed soldiers whose wives were facing legal proceedings while the 
male soldiers were serving in Iraq.91
I advocate that a turn to the Thirteenth Amendment rather than 
ethics can present a better policy solution.  How should the family 
members of soldiers be treated?  The process leading to abolition 
suggests that they should be treated as members of the polity, if not as 
  To date, no blanket policy ad-
dresses these situations and favorable outcomes are only achieved 
through individual interventions by high-level policymakers.  Because 
citizenship is personal and only partially contingent upon familial re-
lations, Jimenez and those in her circumstances stand powerless be-
fore the law, able to turn only to moral suasion for resolution. 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. John Kerry, Kerry Tells Homeland Security Not to Deport Wife of Missing Soldier, JOHN 
KERRY (June 20, 2007), http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=cebda090-62f5-41ed-
8680-741856d0a659.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Letter from Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security, to John Kerry, U.S. 
Senator (June 21, 2007), available at http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=ea809eea-
4266-43ed-b016-f0286019f7a1 (last visited September 5, 2011). 
 91. Juliana Barbassa, Troops Worry Relatives Could Be Deported, USA TODAY, Aug. 10, 
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2007-08-10-1458753044_x.htm. 
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citizens.92
2.  Expanding the Thirteenth Amendment to Protect All Immigrant 
Family Members 
  Certainly they should not be treated as commodities 
(wanted or unwanted) and expelled at will.  The Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s history enables the development of this argument as a matter 
of constitutional principle rather than simply as a generous or advisa-
ble form of forbearance by the state.  The soldier—who cannot be a 
slave—cannot be expected to devote civic service to the state if her or 
his family is not afforded the protection of the state. To expect such 
service renders the soldier an unmoored individual rather than a 
member of a family unit that collectively allows the soldier to give over 
productive energy and possibly blood that belongs to the family to 
serve the interests of the state.  The family itself thus serves the state 
through sacrifice. 
Of course, this framework, if adopted directly from the 1860s, 
would be patriarchal in its nature.  The family, however, is a legal and 
social construct of the state, informed by social practices.  Developing 
a broader argument from the Thirteenth Amendment also enables 
the family that does not fit the patriarchal narrative as perfectly to 
benefit as a matter of right—for instance, the male partner of a fe-
male soldier or the father of a soldier (as opposed to the mother rely-
ing on a long-standing cultural construct of mothers’ contributions of 
sons to war efforts).  
When non-citizen soldiers die in the line of duty, Section 329A 
provides immediate citizenship.  This provision, initially adopted in 
1989, permitted naturalization upon the petition of a next of kin.93  
The law was symbolically important, embedding the idea that the sa-
crifice of one’s life could earn citizenship, but as written, the primary 
impact was strictly symbolic.  The granting of citizenship only affected 
the service member who had died.  Any survivors were prohibited 
from receiving the standard set of benefits provided to the survivors of 
members of the military who were already citizens at the time of their 
deaths.94
In 2003, the issue arose again as Congress considered the Armed 
Forces Naturalization Act.  Individual members of Congress argued 
for expanding the act so that survivors of immigrants could receive 
 
 
 92. See supra text accompanying notes 32–50. 
 93. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1439–1440A (2006). 
 94. Id. 
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death benefits.95  The debate over this element of the bill shows how 
the construction of soldiers produces a narrative of attachment that 
extends to the families.  Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren argued for the 
bill as a positive symbol to support “our troops who serve our Na-
tion . . . and to support their families who must endure the loneliness 
and fear of losing a loved one to uphold the strength of our Nation.”96  
She invoked the figure of the soldier’s mother, who had given her 
child’s life for a nation to which she herself did not belong.  She la-
mented that “we could and should have done more,” but “the Repub-
lican majority, so intent on limiting immigration benefits, wouldn’t 
even allow some mothers of soldiers killed in combat to legally remain 
in this country.”97  Lofgren continued, explaining that “[w]hen an 
immigrant proudly serves in the military and dies for the country, it is 
obvious that she or he has shown devotion to our country.”98  She 
asked, “What about the families of soldiers whom so proudly serve our 
Nation? If the mother of the soldier has overstayed her visa, she is ex-
cluded from the benefits of this bill.”99  “Your son is killed in combat: 
but you are deported.  How are you to put flowers on your son’s 
grave?”100
Lofgren’s analysis did not go unchallenged, however. Represent-
ative Doug Bereuter, a conservative Republican from Nebraska and 
vocal opponent of immigration, responded to Lofgren with another 
familiar trope that incorporated her dependent feminine survivor: 
that of the dangerous immigrant who is not self-supporting.  He pre-
sented this as an equity concern, criticizing the fact that “unlike other 
people seeking legal immigrant status, these family members would 
not be required to meet financial thresholds which indicate that they 
  The soldier Lofgren references in this statement is dead, 
but also gendered male, and the mother is excluded from performing 
her maternal role within the framework of American practices for re-
cognizing and honoring war dead.  The dead soldier’s civic perfor-
mance should, in Lofgren’s reading, render a maternal civic perfor-
mance both possible and desirable even by a mother who is not 
herself a citizen. 
 
 95. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. 13,728, 13,758–59 (2003) (explaining Democratic Con-
gressman John Conyers’s belief that the new law should provide benefits to the families of 
immigrants killed while serving in the military). 
 96. Id. at 13,759–60 (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren). 
 97. Id. at 13,760. 
 98. Id.  Note here the transition from the country to our country in Lofgren’s analysis. 
 99. Id.  Note here that Lofgren has chosen the mildest infraction that prevents a rela-
tive from benefiting. 
 100. Id. 
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would not immediately be public charges.”101  Bereuter’s vision of the 
non-citizen soldier was starkly divergent from Lofgren’s. Lofgren’s 
hypothetical soldier was “proudly” serving and performing, and pro-
viding evidence of attachment to the nation through the act of serv-
ing.  For Bereuter, the provisions allowing for faster tracking for citi-
zenship status for both non-citizen soldiers and their families 
constituted “excessive inducement” to non-citizens to join the mili-
tary.102  He warned that this could result in “this country increasingly 
depending upon what could come to be thought of and called foreign 
mercenaries to serve in the Armed Forces.”103  While the specter of 
foreign mercenaries might be understood to invoke the British hiring 
of Hessians to attempt to suppress the American Revolution, the pa-
rallel Bereuter intended to draw was to the decline and fall of 
Rome.104
The Thirteenth Amendment, however, could strengthen these 
initiatives and provide Congress with the constitutional leverage to 
expand civic membership both for non-citizen soldiers and for the 
non-citizen survivors of soldiers.  The Thirteenth Amendment de-
mands freedom at birth, but links this freedom to family security.  
This linkage has obvious implications for the current debate over 
stripping the children of illegal immigrants of birthright citizenship.  
Right now, the political and constitutional debate is centered on the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Supporters of birthright citizenship em-
phasize the simplicity of its specific text and the consistent judicial in-
terpretation that the circumstances of birth and the status of the birth 
parents do not affect the child’s access to citizenship.  The Thirteenth 
Amendment could play an important role as well.  Chief Justice Ta-
ney’s interpretation of slavery, which we may take as a mirror image 
touchstone for its eradication, emphasizes birth and ancestry as the 
fundamental source of blacks’ inability to achieve citizenship or any 
  While Lofgren’s arguments for expanding the scope of 
benefits to more family members in more questionable circumstances 
did not succeed, the bill did pass, and now non-citizen survivors of 
those declared citizens posthumously have more opportunities both 
to receive benefits and to upgrade their own legal statuses.   
 
 101. Id. (statement of Rep. Doug Bereuter). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  Interestingly, Republican Darrell Issa, who followed Bereuter on the floor and 
is usually known for his highly conservative standpoints on immigration issues, supported 
the bill as it stood with benefits for spouses and children, since in his view this policy would 
“honor the sacrifice of fallen heroes by allowing their spouses and children to enjoy the 
benefits and freedoms of the country they were fighting to defend . . . .”  Id. (statement of 
Rep. Darrell Issa).   
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form of membership in the American polity.105
B.  Marriage Rights 
  The abolition of sla-
very reverses this principle and places belonging and access to free-
dom in the moment of birth itself.  The infant is radically free of any 
stain of ancestry; the principle in the original Constitution that cor-
ruption of blood and nobility by descent shall not be practiced in the 
United States is extended to former slaves.  
Like struggles over the status of immigrants, struggles over mar-
riage have largely played out in reference to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and have centered on the rights of individuals.  Equal protec-
tion and the concept of marriage as a fundamental right have been 
core elements in the transformation of marriage as a state-sanctioned 
relationship through the twentieth century and into the beginning of 
the twenty-first.106  The right to marry as a fundamental right and as a 
privilege subject to equal protection has been developed particularly 
with respect to race in the struggle to eliminate anti-miscegenation 
laws, but currently advocates for same-sex marriage are attempting to 
expand this framework to incorporate their cause.107  The Thirteenth 
Amendment has played little, if any, role in these debates, although 
Robert Burt’s and Darlene Goring’s work are important exceptions.108
This may well be a mistake.  As I have discussed elsewhere, the 
analogy between bans on interracial marriage and bans on same-sex 
marriage is complex and introduces some interesting problems into 
the struggle for same-sex marriage.
   
109
 
 105. For a description of Chief Justice Taney’s analysis in Dred Scott, see supra text ac-
companying notes 
  Fundamentally, the path taken 
in Loving v. Virginia to eliminate bans on interracial marriage at the 
national level endorsed a thin vision of racial equality that did not at-
tend to deeply rooted historical structures of subordination.  The 
Thirteenth Amendment has clear historical drawbacks, as I outline 
10–15. 
 106. See Julie Novkov, The Miscegenation/Same-Sex Marriage Analogy: What Can We Learn 
from Legal History? 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 345, 356–58 (2008) (explaining how the Su-
preme Court used the Equal Protection Clause to declare bans on interracial marriage to 
be unconstitutional). 
 107. See id. at 358–79 (explaining how the framework of the Equal Protection Clause 
used in interracial marriage cases can be analogized to same-sex marriage). 
 108. See Robert A. Burt, Overruling Dred Scott: The Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 17 
WIDENER L.J. 73, 78 (2007) (explaining that both “the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments were the fulfillment of the generalized promise of the American Revolu-
tion”); Darlene C. Goring, The History of Slave Marriage in the United States, 39 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 299 (2006) (analogizing between prohibitions on slave marriages and prohibitions 
on same-sex marriage).  
 109. Novkov, supra note 106. 
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below, but could present an opportunity to freshen and refocus the 
debate on a different set of historical concerns. 
As Dred Scott and its demise suggest, the free capacity to marry 
and form a family unit is fundamentally incompatible with slavery.  
The act of marriage itself abrogates the status of slavery through its 
marking of the participants in the marriage as fully competent makers 
of the marriage contract.110  Slaves at times attempted to engage in 
this form of autonomy but the southern states refused to acknowledge 
these relationships as marriages even while northern states saw valid 
marriages as changing slaves’ status to that of freedmen.  One of the 
first and most urgent agendas of emancipation was to organize and 
recognize marital relationships.111
The analogy to contemporary same-sex families is clear: some 
same-sex couples form bonded relationships and seek recognition of 
these relationships from their communities, families, and/or religious 
leaders.  While neither the state nor any private individual has the ca-
pacity to separate these couples by force, the state can choose to 
render these couples as legal strangers to each other.  Such render-
ings run the gamut from mild (the reservation of marriage as a specif-
ic relation only to opposite sex couples with the provision of all of its 
state-recognized benefits to same-sex couples through civil unions) to 
quite harsh (constitutional amendments in some states that bar the 
state from ever providing any of the incidences of marriage to same-
sex couples).
 
112  Beyond these individual state laws, federal law allows 
states to deny marital status to sojourners and immigrants through the 
Defense of Marriage Act, which renders the geographic authority of 
any state policy supreme over legal relationships contracted in other 
states.113
In some states, the analogy is stronger, as they prevent not only 
the sanctioned formation of bonded couples, but also bar the en-
trance of legally recognized offspring into the relationship by limiting 
adoption rights for same-sex couples.  These limits may allow individ-
ual adoptions but bar same-sex couples from jointly adopting a child 
or even prevent a same-sex partner from adopting the biological child 
of her or his partner without terminating the biological parent’s pa-
 
 
 110. See supra text accompanying notes 32–47. 
 111. See supra text accompanying notes 32–47. 
 112. See Quick Facts, LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE, http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/ 
quick-facts.html (explaining the status of same-sex relationships by state) (last visited Oct. 
4, 2011). 
 113. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
CROSSES STATE LINES (2006). 
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rental rights.114  Such limits effectively prevent the formation or con-
tinuation of a legally sanctioned family headed by two parents of the 
same sex by barring or disfavoring the placement of children with 
such couples or by forcing at least one of the parents to remain a legal 
stranger to the child she or he is parenting.115
The relationship to the institution of slavery lies in the lack of 
recognition of these relationships and in the insistence that they can-
not be legitimized.  The analogy is further strengthened by its roo-
tedness in state law and geographic sovereignty.  Dred Scott’s geograph-
ic principle was that states had the capacity to define slaves as unfree 
chattel, and that even a marriage contracted outside of slave territory 
did not render the partners free.
  
116  The elimination of slavery did not 
just permit but demanded the expansion of marriage.  It involved 
federal authority actively for the first time in marriage politics, as first 
military officials and then Freedmen’s Bureau agents acted to support 
marriage and family formation in robust ways.117
Likewise, the denial of recognition for the marital and familial 
relationship is a contemporary badge of servitude or at least of deep 
inferiority.  Even lesbians and gay men who live in jurisdictions where 
same-sex marriage is allowed cannot enjoy recognition throughout 
the borders of the nation.  Their relationship, and thus their free-
dom, depends upon their presence in a state that acknowledges and 
protects it.  And if marriage still serves the purpose of providing state-
supported recognition for the child members of a family unit, the 
children of same-sex couples, like the children of slaves, are rendered 
bare of legal protection by laws that refuse to recognize their own 
freedom by virtue of birth. 
  
A Thirteenth Amendment analysis that places familial relations 
in a constitutional frame recognizes that some same-sex relationships 
do actively constitute families in which the members intend to fulfill 
the functions of families in their relation to the state.  The public ac-
 
 114. Jason N.W. Plowman, When Second-Parent Adoption Is the Second-Best Option: The Case 
for Legislative Reform as the Next Best Option for Same-Sex Couples in the Face of Continued Mar-
riage Inequality, 11 SCHOLAR 57, 63–64  (2010). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See supra text accompanying notes 10–15. 
 117. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 39.  For evidence that this new federal concern 
with marriage politics and policies was no passing phase, one need look only to the massive 
shift of federal prosecutorial resources from the suppression of violent anti-black orga-
nized resistance in the South in the early 1870s to the suppression of polygamy in the Utah 
Territory in the late 1870s through the 1890s.  See SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE 
MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
AMERICA (2002). 
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knowledgment of long-term pair bonds and the situation of these 
bonds generate a membership unit for the state that differs from and 
in some regards supersedes that of the individuals who form the 
bond.  Especially when a same-sex couple chooses to raise children, 
states that refuse to acknowledge these relations as familial bonds 
place not just the individuals but the families themselves in a subordi-
nated relationship to the state in terms that contradict the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s command that legitimate families be acknowledged as 
units of the state. 
C.  Difficulties That the Thirteenth Amendment Presents 
I do not mean to imply that establishing Thirteenth Amendment 
arguments for greater freedom for immigrants, lesbians and gay men, 
and their families will be easy or smooth, especially since constitu-
tional arguments with right-leaning implications are more in favor in 
the current political climate than those with left-leaning implications.  
However, the greater problem is that the Thirteenth Amendment it-
self, while it has the potential for the progressive implications I’ve out-
lined here, is rooted historically in a particular and problematic con-
figuration of gender relations.  As my discussion indicates, arguments 
about freedom rooted in marriage from the late 1850s through the 
1880s rest upon the extension of a classical liberal and masculine va-
riety of freedom to freedmen as heads of household, with women 
gaining freedom secondarily through their connections to these men 
and the men’s rights depending in part upon their newfound duties 
toward dependent and subordinated women.118
IV.  CONCLUSION 
  Likewise, the figure 
of the child itself and the child’s role in the family have changed dras-
tically since the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Children, for 
most American parents, are anything but economic assets or back-
stops to protect adults from poverty and lack of care in old age. 
These concerns are vexing.  But they are structurally similar to 
the concerns one might raise about the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
particular conception of equality and its ambiguous scope at the time 
when the Amendment was drafted and adopted.  The possibility I see 
in the Thirteenth Amendment also depends upon using slavery and 
its abolition as a two-way form of argumentation.  The Thirteenth 
Amendment’s ban on slavery and its incidences can ground substan-
 
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 32–47. 
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tive attacks against what we might interpret as progressed forms of 
servitude.  But by the same token, any recognition of marriage and 
familial relations can also provide the leverage to argue for fuller 
forms of membership in the polity as they are incompatible with sla-
very and its badges.  As we translate marriage and familial relations in-
to their contemporary forms and places in American society, we can 
pull the Thirteenth Amendment forward in time as well to think 
through the meaning and significance of servitude or state-sponsored 
disrespect. 
This thought experiment cannot ground a complete theory of li-
beration for immigrants and their families or for lesbians and gay 
men (or bisexuals or transgendered individuals, for that matter) be-
cause it rests in familial relations rather than individual rights.  But 
bringing familial relations into the picture may also open up new pos-
sibilities by configuring the American as something other than a sin-
gle individual who experiences and exercises rights outside of any 
deeply intimate context with another human being.  
 
